Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying Remand
Pending is Plaintiff’s motion to remand this action to the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The motion is DENIED.
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The Southern District of West Virginia offers a database of opinions starting in the year 2001, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search to the right or sort using the drop-downs below.
2:02-cv-01078
Author:
Charles H. Haden II
2:02-cv-00983
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending are Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion in part and DISMISSES all counts of the Complaint except Counts IV and VI, alleging a violation of constitutional rights of equal protection and a violation of civil rights. Count VI is retained solely as it pertains to the equal protection count. Because Count I for injunctive relief is DISMISSED, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED as moot.
Author:
Charles H. Haden II
2:95-cv-01098
Memorandum Opinion and Order Approving Settlement
At a fairness hearing held October 2, 2002 came the Plaintiffs by class counsel, Henry Dart and Richard Neely, and came the Defendant, FMC Corporation, by its counsel, Joseph Beeson, for a fairness hearing pursuant to Rule 23(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Author:
Charles H. Haden II
2:02-cv-00139
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending is Defendant's motion to dismiss the remaining count of this civil action. For reasons discussed below, the motion is DENIED.
Author:
Charles H. Haden II
5:02-cv-00497
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Petitioner Morales brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking a writ of habeas corpus. By standing order, it was referred to Magistrate Judge R. Clarke Vandervort, who has submitted his Proposed Findings and Recommendation (PF&R). Petitioner requested an extension of time to respond to the PF&R, which was granted, and then filed timely objections. The Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s report to which Petitioner objects.
Author:
Charles H. Haden II
2:02-cv-00042
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Edward Lee Lewis was indicted on four counts of mailing threatening communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 (2002), one count of mailing a threat to the President in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 871 & 2(b) (2002), and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), & 924(e)(1) (2002). Prior to trial, Lewis filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the Government’s expert witness, forensic document analyst John W. Cawley, III, under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court GRANTED the motion, finding that Mr. Cawley’s testimony was not sufficiently reliable to meet the standards for expert testimony under Rule 702, as explicated by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). At trial, after the close of the Government’s evidence and at the close of all the evidence, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court DENIED the motions. The defendant now moves for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29(c), and for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33 [Docket 82]. The court DENIES that motion. The court writes to further explain its rulings.
Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
5:01-cv-00993
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Defendants/Appellants Michael O. Callaghan, Secretary of the West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (“DEP”), and the State of West Virginia appeal two orders of the Bankruptcy Court. The first order denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and granted the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by the debtor’s Trustee, H. Lynden Graham, Jr. The second order denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and granted the Trustee’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. For reasons set forth below, the first judgment of the Bankruptcy Court is REVERSED. The second judgment is VACATED as moot.
Author:
Charles H. Haden II
2:02-cv-00347
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the court is the plaintiffs request for discovery on the issue of whether the "Change in Control Severance Agreement" between the plaintiff, Richard C. Donovan, and One Valley Bank, the predecessor of the defendant, Branch Banking and Trust Company, constitutes a "plan" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1947 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. If ERISA preempts the plaintiffs claims, this court may not consider evidence outside of the administrative record. Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1026-27 (4th Cir. 1993 ). The court, therefore, invited the parties to file briefs regarding the existence of a "plan" under ERISA. For the reasons that follow, the court FINDS that the Change in Control Severance Agreement is not a "plan" within the meaning of ERISA and DENIES the plaintiffs request for further discovery on that issue. Because there is diversity between the parties, this court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996). The court will promptly enter a scheduling order.
Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:02-cv-00850
Memorandum Opinion and Remand Order
Pending are the motions of Plaintiffs in these three related civil actions to remand. Plaintiffs’ motions are GRANTED.
Author:
Charles H. Haden II
2:00-cv-01156
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, which the Court reinstated for consideration following the Order of July 29, 2002 and the parties’ ensuing supplemental briefing. After considering the parties’ submissions, supplemental materials, and the administrative record, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s cross motion.
Author:
Charles H. Haden II