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Memorandum Opinion And Order
Pending before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 42]. The motion offers several arguments in favor of dismissal, but the dispositive issue in this case is whether the intra-military immunity doctrine deprives this court of jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Plaintiff, a dual-status technician with both military and civilian roles. For the reasons explained below, I find that it does. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 5], and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13].
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Granting Motion to Adjust Payment Plan Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k)
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the court is a Motion for Charging Order filed by Plaintiff SFG Commercial Aircraft Leasing, Inc. (“SFG”). [ECF No. 28]. For the reasons set forth herein, SFG’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Memorandum Opinion And Order
Pending are competing motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff White Pine Insurance Company ('White Pine") and Intervenor Frank White, Jr. ("White). (ECF Nos. 23, 25). White Pine and White have filed responses, replies, and a surreply, all of which have been considered by the Court. Defendant Interstate Towing, LLC ("Interstate"), has not participated in this action to date, but its involvement is not necessary to resolve the substantive question raised in the complaint for declaratory relief. Therefore, the Court finds the issue fully briefed and ready for resolution.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
West Virginia passed a law that defines “girl” and “woman,” for the purpose of secondary school sports, as biologically female. Under the law, all biological males, including those who identify as transgender girls, are ineligible for participation on girls’ sports teams. B.P.J., a transgender girl who wants to play girls’ sports, challenges the law. The question before the court is whether the legislature’s chosen definition of “girl” and “woman” in this context is constitutionally permissible. I find that it is.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
The question before the court is whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms, and 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which prohibits possession of a firearm with an altered, obliterated, or removed serial number, are constitutional after the Supreme Court’s recent decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022). After considering the arguments presented here, I find that Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional, but I find that Section 922(k) is not. For the following reasons, Mr. Price’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him is GRANTED as to Count Two and DENIED as to Count One.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
There are seventeen filings pending before the court, including Defendant Tawayne Love’s Motion for Reduction of Sentence pursuant to the First Step Act. [ECF No. 786]. Mr. Love is a federal prisoner, who has been incarcerated for eighteen years or 38% of his life, largely based on his status as a career offender at sentencing. A defendant is a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines if, among other things, “the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (emphasis added). One of Mr. Love’s qualifying felony convictions was for Possession with Intent to Deliver Marijuana in violation of Pennsylvania law. Since his marijuana conviction nearly 30 years ago, federal and state law reflect a radical policy shift towards the decriminalization of marijuana, which mirrors the contemporary views of society.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 211), Defendant Board of Education, Cabell County Schools’ (“Board” or “CCBOE”) Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 209), and Defendant Todd Alexander’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 206). For the reasons herein, Defendant Board’s Motion is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s cross-Motion is DENIED. Defendant Alexander’s Motion is GRANTED, in part, as to Count One, and DENIED, in part, as to Count Three.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
The Court has reviewed the Defendant’s Bruen-Based Motion to Dismiss (Document 62), the Response of the United States to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Document 66) and the Defendant’s Reply on Bruen-Based Motion to Dismiss (Document 67). For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the renewed motion to dismiss should be denied.