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Opinions

The Southern District of West Virginia offers a database of opinions starting in the year 2001, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search to the right or sort using the drop-downs below.

5:18-cv-01336

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Pending are Plaintiff Komatsu Financial Limited Partnership’s (“Komatsu”) (1) Renewed Motion for Order of Payment By Southern Coal Corporation (“Southern”) to Komatsu Pursuant to Suggestion [ECF Nos. 182-2; 220], filed April 28, 2023, and (2) First Amended Motion for Further Proceedings Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 38-5-18 on James C. Justice Companies, Inc.’s (“JCJC”) Answer to Suggestion (“First Amended Motion”) [ECF 199], filed May 31, 2023.

Author:
Frank W. Volk
2:22-cv-00168

Memorandum Opinion And Order

Pending before the court are cross-motions for summary filed by Defendant Ranger Scientific, LLC (“Ranger”) [ECF No. 51], and Plaintiff North Avenue Capital, LLC (“NAC”), [ECF No. 53]. Because the motions raise substantially similar arguments in favor of summary judgment, I will dispose of them together. For the reasons stated herein, NAC’s Motion [ECF No. 53] is DENIED, and Ranger’s Motion [ECF No. 51] is GRANTED.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
3:19-cv-00710

Memorandum Opinion And Order

Pending before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Disqualify Next Friends. [ECF No. 341]. Plaintiffs have responded in opposition. [ECF No. 359]. For the reasons stated herein, the motion is DENIED.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
3:19-cv-00710

Memorandum Opinion And Order

Pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion for Class Certification and Appointment of Class Counsel. [ECF No. 318]. For the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:21-cv-00612

Memorandum Opinion And Order

Pending before the court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. [ECF No. 42]. The motion offers several arguments in favor of dismissal, but the dispositive issue in this case is whether the intra-military immunity doctrine deprives this court of jurisdiction over the claims asserted by Plaintiff, a dual-status technician with both military and civilian roles. For the reasons explained below, I find that it does. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:23-cv-00304

Memorandum Opinion And Order

Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 5], and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13].

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
6:12-cr-00210

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Granting Motion to Adjust Payment Plan Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k)

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:21-mc-00095

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court is a Motion for Charging Order filed by Plaintiff SFG Commercial Aircraft Leasing, Inc. (“SFG”). [ECF No. 28]. For the reasons set forth herein, SFG’s Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
3:21-cv-00429

Memorandum Opinion And Order

Pending are competing motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff White Pine Insurance Company ('White Pine") and Intervenor Frank White, Jr. ("White). (ECF Nos. 23, 25). White Pine and White have filed responses, replies, and a surreply, all of which have been considered by the Court. Defendant Interstate Towing, LLC ("Interstate"), has not participated in this action to date, but its involvement is not necessary to resolve the substantive question raised in the complaint for declaratory relief. Therefore, the Court finds the issue fully briefed and ready for resolution.

Author:
Cheryl A. Eifert
2:21-cv-00316

Memorandum Opinion and Order

West Virginia passed a law that defines “girl” and “woman,” for the purpose of secondary school sports, as biologically female. Under the law, all biological males, including those who identify as transgender girls, are ineligible for participation on girls’ sports teams. B.P.J., a transgender girl who wants to play girls’ sports, challenges the law. The question before the court is whether the legislature’s chosen definition of “girl” and “woman” in this context is constitutionally permissible. I find that it is.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin

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