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Memorandum Order
Pending before the court is plaintiffs' motion to remand, filed August 28, 2003, seeking to remand the 15 "Barge cases" to the Circuit Court of Mason County. The "Barge cases" were removed by defendants by their notice of removal filed July 29,2003.
Memorandum Order
This is an action for a declaratory judgment asking the court to hold unconstitutional that provision of the election laws of West Virginia which prohibits utilities and railroads from forming political action committees or "PACS." The plaintiffs are Appalachian Power Company, Monongahela Power Company, The Potomac Edison Company and West Virginia-American Water Company, public utilities with extensive operations in West Virginia, and Norfolk Southern Railway Company and CSX Corporation, major interstate rail carriers with significant presences in West Virginia. The defendants are the Secretary of State of West Virginia who, as the state’s chief election official is charged with the administration and enforcement of the election laws,1 and William J. Sadler, Prosecuting Attorney of Mercer County, West Virginia. Sadler is sued as representative of a class consisting of the fifty-five prosecuting attorneys in West Virginia; the prosecuting attorneys are responsible for enforcing the criminal penalty provisions of the election laws. By Order entered on September 27, 2001, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and found that Sadler would fairly and accurately protect the interests of the class.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
CurrentIy pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Defendants have not filed a response to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Also currently pending before the Court is the Motion of Defendant 99¢ Only Stores to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Brief in Support thereof. In response, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Response to Defendant 99¢ Only Stores' Motion to Dismiss. In reply thereto, Defendant 99¢ Only Stores filed Defendant 99¢ Only Stores' Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Having reviewed the aforementioned Motions, all memoranda in support thereof and in opposition thereto, as well as all relevant case and statutory law, the Court is now prepared to issue its decision.
Order
At a hearing conducted on February 13, 2004, this Court DENIED Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The Order more fully sets forth the Court’s rationale.
Memorandum Opinion
On February 10, 2004, the court entered an order granting Defendant Gray's Motion to Suppress and ordering the exclusion of all evidence obtained through an unlawful search of Mr. Gray's home that occurred on July 3, 2003 [Docket 55]. The court found that the government failed to meet its burden of proving that Mr. Gray knowingly and voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into his home and that the officers' entry therefore constituted an unlawful search. In addition, the court found that the subsequently issued warrant to search Mr. Gray's home was invalid because the warrant was based solely on evidence obtained during the illegal predicate search and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in this circumstance. The rationale for these rulings is explained below.
Order
Pending before the court is the defendant Dianna Johnson's motion to dismiss [Docket 20]. Ms. Johnson moves the court (1) to dismiss Count 3 of the plaintiff DIRECTV, Inc.'s complaint [Docket 1] for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and (2) to dismiss Ms. Johnson from the action because of the improper joinder of parties. Count 3 of the complaint alleges that the defendant is civilly liable for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2512. Because neither 18 U.S.C. § 2512 nor 18 U.S.C. § 2520 provides for civil liability for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2512, I FIND that Count 3 of the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Accordingly, I GRANT the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 3 of the complaint. I also FIND that the claims against Ms. Johnson are not reasonably related to the claims against the other defendants, and I therefore GRANT Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21. I also FIND that all other defendants except the first named defendant are improperly joined, and, accordingly, ORDER sua sponte the dismissal without prejudice of all other defendants except the first named defendant.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion In Limine for a Pre-Trial Ruling Regarding the Application of West Virginia Code Section 55-7B-8 and For a Ruling That Each Separately Read, Interpreted, Dictated and Billed-For Radiology Consultation Is a Separate Occurrence (Plaintiffs’ Motion) [Docket 113]. I previously granted the defendants’ request for permission to file a supplemental memorandum at the close of discovery on the issue of whether each radiology consultation constituted a separate occurrence. For the reasons discussed below, I now FIND that West Virginia Code § 55-7B-8, as enacted at the time of the alleged occurrences of medical malpractice here, limited an individual health care provider’s liability for an occurrence of medical malpractice to $1,000,000. Section 55-7B-8 did not limit the total amount a plaintiff could recover in a single action from different health care providers for their separate acts of medical malpractice.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending are Plaintiffs’ motions to remand. The Court DENIES the motions.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending is Plaintiff Brenda Campbell’s motion to remand. The Court DENIES the motion.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the court is the plaintiffs’ motion for entry of default judgment and sanctions [Docket 106]. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Mary E. Stanley. Magistrate Judge Stanley treated the plaintiffs’ motion as dispositive under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and issued proposed findings and a recommendation that the court deny the plaintiffs’ motion [Docket 123]. The plaintiffs timely filed objections to the findings and recommendation by the Magistrate Judge [Docket 126]. For the reasons that follow, the court AFFIRMS Magistrate Judge Stanley’s findings.