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Opinions

The Southern District of West Virginia offers a database of opinions starting in the year 2001, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search to the right or sort using the drop-downs below.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. James W. Coe, et al. 04/07/2004
1:03-cv-00388

Memorandum Opinion in Support of Order Directing Arbitration of State Court Claims

Before the court is Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.’s (“Merrill Lynch”) motion for an order directing arbitration, sought in accordance with § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act.  See 9 U.S.C. § 4.  The defendants in this matter, James Coe, John Wade, Robert and Joann Harmon, and Ora Robertson, Jr. (“state court plaintiffs”) are plaintiffs in various proceedings pending in the Circuit Court of McDowell County, West Virginia (“state court actions”).  Pursuant to § 4 the court conducted a hearing on January 6, 2004, and determined that the making of an agreement to arbitrate was “in issue.”  The court accordingly conducted a bench trial on February 27, 2004, in Charleston, West Virginia.  At this trial, the parties presented evidence concerning the alleged arbitration agreements and any defenses applicable to them.  The court has concluded that it must order the state court plaintiffs to arbitrate the claims being litigated in the state court actions and has accordingly issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support of its ruling.  This memorandum opinion details the court’s legal and factual findings and discusses the critical issue in this case, whether West Virginia public policy prohibits enforcement of the arbitration agreements at issue here.1

Author:
David A. Faber
Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Energy Development Corporation, et al. 04/07/2004
1:03-cv-00307

Dismissal Order

For the reasons herein detailed, the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this dispute. Accordingly, the court is obliged to order this matter dismissed sua sponte.

Author:
David A. Faber
Gary L. Barge, et al. v. Western Southern Life Insurance Company, et al. 03/30/2004
3:03-cv-00818

Memorandum Order

Pending before the court is plaintiffs' motion to remand, filed August 28, 2003, seeking to remand the 15 "Barge cases" to the Circuit Court of Mason County. The "Barge cases" were removed by defendants by their notice of removal filed July 29,2003.

Author:
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
Appalachian Power Company, et al. v. William J. Sadler, et al. 03/29/2004
1:00-cv-01159

Memorandum Order

This is an action for a declaratory judgment asking the court to hold unconstitutional that provision of the election laws of West Virginia which prohibits utilities and railroads from forming political action committees or "PACS."  The plaintiffs are Appalachian Power Company, Monongahela Power Company, The Potomac Edison Company and West Virginia-American Water Company, public utilities with extensive operations in West Virginia, and Norfolk Southern Railway Company and CSX Corporation, major interstate rail carriers with significant presences in West Virginia.  The defendants are the Secretary of State of West Virginia who, as the state’s chief election official is charged with the administration and enforcement of the election laws,1 and William J. Sadler, Prosecuting Attorney of Mercer County, West Virginia.  Sadler is sued as representative of a class consisting of the fifty-five prosecuting attorneys in West Virginia; the prosecuting attorneys are responsible for enforcing the criminal penalty provisions of the election laws.  By Order entered on September 27, 2001, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and found that Sadler would fairly and accurately protect the interests of the class.

Author:
David A. Faber
Emmett Cunningham v. Bombay Productions, Inc., et al. 03/23/2004
2:03-cv-00677

Memorandum Opinion and Order

CurrentIy pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Defendants have not filed a response to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. Also currently pending before the Court is the Motion of Defendant 99¢ Only Stores to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Brief in Support thereof. In response, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Response to Defendant 99¢ Only Stores' Motion to Dismiss. In reply thereto, Defendant 99¢ Only Stores filed Defendant 99¢ Only Stores' Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Having reviewed the aforementioned Motions, all memoranda in support thereof and in opposition thereto, as well as all relevant case and statutory law, the Court is now prepared to issue its decision.

Author:
Elizabeth V. Hallanan
Pritchard Electric Company, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 317 03/02/2004
3:04-cv-00057

Order

At a hearing conducted on February 13, 2004, this Court DENIED Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.  The Order more fully sets forth the Court’s rationale.

Author:
Robert C. Chambers
United States of America v. Joshua Brent Gray 02/19/2004
3:03-cr-00182

Memorandum Opinion

On February 10, 2004, the court entered an order granting Defendant Gray's Motion to Suppress and ordering the exclusion of all evidence obtained through an unlawful search of Mr. Gray's home that occurred on July 3, 2003 [Docket 55]. The court found that the government failed to meet its burden of proving that Mr. Gray knowingly and voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into his home and that the officers' entry therefore constituted an unlawful search. In addition, the court found that the subsequently issued warrant to search Mr. Gray's home was invalid because the warrant was based solely on evidence obtained during the illegal predicate search and that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in this circumstance. The rationale for these rulings is explained below.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Everett Boggess, et al. 02/13/2004
2:03-cv-02147

Order

Pending before the court is the defendant Dianna Johnson's motion to dismiss [Docket 20]. Ms. Johnson moves the court (1) to dismiss Count 3 of the plaintiff DIRECTV, Inc.'s complaint [Docket 1] for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and (2) to dismiss Ms. Johnson from the action because of the improper joinder of parties.  Count 3 of the complaint alleges that the defendant is civilly liable for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2512.  Because neither 18 U.S.C. § 2512 nor 18 U.S.C. § 2520 provides for civil liability for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2512, I FIND that Count 3 of the complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.  Accordingly, I GRANT the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 3 of the complaint.  I also FIND that the claims against Ms. Johnson are not reasonably related to the claims against the other defendants, and I therefore GRANT Ms. Johnson's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 and 21.  I also FIND that all other defendants except the first named defendant are improperly joined, and, accordingly, ORDER sua sponte the dismissal without prejudice of all other defendants except the first named defendant.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
Kristie Daniel and Earl Daniel v. Bonnie Beaver, M.D., et al. 02/05/2004
3:02-cv-00174

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion In Limine for a Pre-Trial Ruling Regarding the Application of West Virginia Code Section 55-7B-8 and For a Ruling That Each Separately Read, Interpreted, Dictated and Billed-For Radiology Consultation Is a Separate Occurrence (Plaintiffs’ Motion) [Docket 113].  I previously granted the defendants’ request for permission to file a supplemental memorandum at the close of discovery on the issue of whether each radiology consultation constituted a separate occurrence.  For the reasons  discussed below, I now FIND that West Virginia Code § 55-7B-8, as enacted at the time of the alleged occurrences of medical malpractice here, limited an individual health care provider’s liability for an occurrence of medical malpractice to $1,000,000.  Section 55-7B-8 did not limit the total amount a plaintiff could recover in a single action from different health care providers for their separate acts of medical malpractice.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
Charles Burns, et al. v. Western Southern Life Insurance Company, et al. 01/28/2004
3:03-cv-00748

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending are Plaintiffs’ motions to remand.  The Court DENIES the motions.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin

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