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Opinions

The Southern District of West Virginia offers a database of opinions starting in the year 2001, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search to the right or sort using the drop-downs below.

6:06-cv-00530

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court is the plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification [Docket 188]. Under Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court must determine whether to certify the action as a class action “[a]t an early practicable time.”  This determination should only be made “when the court has sufficient information to decide whether the action meets the certification criteria of Rules 23(a) and (b).”  Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, § 21.133 (2004). For the reasons stated below, this court FINDS that it does not have sufficient information to determine whether the plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of proving the requirements of Rule 23.  The court ORDERS that a preliminary class certification hearing be held on July 2, 2008, at 11:00 a.m. in Charleston.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
6:06-cv-00530

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court is the plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Dr. Elizabeth L. Anderson as an expert witness for the defendant [Docket 170].  For reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:04-cv-00813

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending is the motion for partial summary judgment of Mid-State Surety Corporation (“Mid-State”), filed February 6, 2006.  Also pending is the motion for partial summary judgment of International Fidelity Insurance Company (“Fidelity”), initially filed April 3, 2006, as a memorandum in opposition to Mid-State’s motion for partial summary judgment, and recharacterized as a motion for summary judgment by order entered September 5, 2007.1

Author:
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
3:07-cv-00413

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before this Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 56 and 59).  For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ cross-motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.  Defendants’ cross-motion is also GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Also pending is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Exhibit to Their Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Doc. 68).  This motion is GRANTED.

Author:
Robert C. Chambers
2:07-cv-00478

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order (docket # 17), filed April 25, 2008, to which Defendant responded in opposition (# 18) on April 27, 2008.  Plaintiffs did not file a timely reply.1  The Memorandum Opinion and Order entered by the Hon. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., presiding District Judge, on February 25, 2008 (# 12), sets forth the claims of the parties.  To summarize, this is a first party breach of contract and bad faith action by attorneys against their legal malpractice insurer.

Author:
Mary E. Stanley
5:06-cv-00022

Amended Memorandum Opinion1

Plaintiff Barbara Kitchen brings this action against Defendant Summers Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC (formerly known as Summers Continuous Care Center, LLC) (Summers) alleging wrongful discharge and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA).2  Pending before the Court is Summers’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 80].  For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.

Author:
Thomas E. Johnston
2:06-cv-00535

Memorandum Opinion and Order

The court is called upon to decide, pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whether defendants Aquamine and Victaulic (“Defendants”) have shown good cause for certain documents, marked “CONFIDENTIAL” prior to disclosure to Plaintiffs during discovery, to remain confidential and subject to the court’s form protective order.

Author:
Mary E. Stanley
2:08-cv-00073

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court are the respondents’ Motions to Dismiss Petition for Injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act [Dockets 26 & 30]. The respondents argue that the petition for an interim injunction should be dismissed on two independent grounds. First, the respondents urge dismissal because the petitioner lacks the legal authority to bring the petition on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board. Second, the respondents argue that injunctive relief is not “just and proper” under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:07-cr-00153

Memorandum Opinion and Order

I conducted a sentencing hearing on April 9, 2008.  After calculating the relevant guideline range, hearing argument and evidence, and analyzing the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, I imposed a variance sentence of 30 months imprisonment, followed by a supervised release term of 4 years, which is below the guideline imprisonment range of 37 to 46 months.  In this Memorandum Opinion, I explain why the conversion ratios contained in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 app. note 10(D) result in unwarranted sentencing disparities.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
5:06-cv-00575

Memorandum Opinion

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 16] and the IRS’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 18].1  This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal for re-determination of the validity of taxes assessed for the tax periods ending September 30, 1993 and December 31, 1993, respectively.  Plaintiff originally challenged the validity of the assessments in a collection due process (CDP) hearing before the IRS Appeals Office, which upheld the assessments.  Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6320(c) and 6330(d), Plaintiff appealed the IRS’s determination to the Tax Court.  Finding that it lacked jurisdiction,2 the Tax Court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal and instructed her to re-file her appeal in the appropriate United States District Court.  On July 21, 2006, Plaintiff timely filed her appeal in this Court.  The parties agreed to resolve the case on cross-motions for summary judgment, (See Docket 22 ¶ 3), and the Court heard oral argument on the cross-motions.  For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 16] and DENIES the IRS’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 18].

Author:
Thomas E. Johnston

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