Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending is the plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court and for attorney’s fees and costs related to that motion [Docket 24].  For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the motion to remand and REMANDS the case to state court.  The court DENIES the motion for costs and attorney’s fees.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Currently pending before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Citifinancial Mortgage Company, Inc. (hereinafter Citifinancial) and Defendant Creve Coeur Mortgage Associates, Inc. (hereinafter CCM).  In its motion, CCM adopts and incorporates by reference four of the arguments made by Citifinancial.  In addition, CCM seeks to dismiss a claim by Plaintiffs Dorothy L. Polis and Marshall G. Jarrell that CCM engaged in the unauthorized practice of law as contained in Count V of the Amended Complaint.  By Order entered on October 22, 2002, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Count V with prejudice.  Therefore, the Court DENIES as moot CCM’s motion to dismiss this claim against it.  As to the remaining arguments made by Defendants Citifinancial and CCM, the Court GRANTS in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count I and DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the remaining counts.

Memorandum Opinion and Order

This civil action is a so-called "first party bad faith claim"¹ that Defendant and its counsel engaged in unfair trade practices in connection with Plaintiff's claim for underinsured motorist insurance coverage benefits following a 1999 fatal accident. For the purpose of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the court assumes to be true the allegations that Plaintiff's son, Charles Mordesovitch, a pedestrian, was killed when he was struck by a vehicle operated by a drunk driver who had become intoxicated at a bar. Plaintiff, represented by Christopher Heavens, was insured by Defendant. In the underlying action, Plaintiff sued the driver, the bar, and Defendant (which was represented by the law firm of Kesner, Kesner & Bramble) . Plaintiff and Defendant executed a settlement agreement in which Defendant paid the $300,000 limits of its underinsured motorist coverage to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff signed a "Release, Settlement and Subrogation Agreement." The Agreement provided that "Westfield shall be subrogated to the extent of its payment of underinsurance and medical payments to [Plaintiff]." Plaintiff continued his action against the bar and ultimately recovered the full limits of the liability insurance coverage available to the bar. Plaintiff established that the estate had not been made whole by the settlement with the bar's insurer, and Defendant ultimately waived its subrogation claim. Plaintiff then filed the instant action, alleging that Defendant, acting through its adjuster Eric Sikorski and the Kesner law firm, engaged in unfair trade practices by improperly seeking subrogation from the proceeds of the settlement with the bar. Plaintiff contends "that Westfield illegally sought subrogation from the plaintiff and his family, and then attempted in bad faith to delay the plaintiff's settlement with another tortfeasor as a way of pressuring the plaintiff to pay money to Westfield." (Plaintiff's Response, # 66, at 2.)

Judgement Order

This is an action alleging unauthorized use of communications in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. Plaintiff, Entertainment by J&J, Inc., alleges that the Defendants, Gridiron, Inc., a West Virginia corporation d/b/a/ Gridiron Sports Bar, Tina Runyon, and Donny Kyle, unlawfully and willfully intercepted and exhibited the closed-circuit telecast of the September 18, 1999, championship boxing match between Oscar De La Hoya and Felix Trinidad for commercial gain. Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default as to Defendants and an entry of default was entered by the Clerk on March 7, 2001. On April 11, 2001, the Court ordered a hearing set for Wednesday, May 2, 2001 for a determination of Plaintiff's request for the maximum amount in statutory damages totaling $170,000 pursuant to 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. On May 2, 2001, at the aforesaid damages hearing, the Court was informed that Defendants had not been served with notice of hearing. Therefore, the Court ordered that the hearing be continued until Defendants could be served with notice of the damages hearing. The Court rescheduled the damages hearing for June 19, 2001. For administrative reasons, the Court again rescheduled the damages hearing, moving the date of said hearing from June 19, 2001 to June 21, 2001.