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Opinions

The Southern District of West Virginia offers a database of opinions starting in the year 2001, listed by year and judge. For a more detailed search, enter the keyword or case number in the search to the right or sort using the drop-downs below.

2:05-cr-00003

Sentencing Memorandum and Statement of Reasons

In 2004, as the result of an extensive international investigation, federal authorities suspected the defendant, Bernard E. Raby, of being a consumer of child pornography.  On December 15, 2004, a search warrant was executed on Mr. Raby’s residence in Foster, West Virginia.  Mr. Raby met the authorities at his front door and agreed to be interviewed.  After waiving his constitutional rights, Mr. Raby admitted to possessing, on various electronic-storage devices, approximately 2000 sexually explicit images of underage boys.1  Some of these images depicted prepubescent boys.  Mr. Raby also admitted to having engaged in sexual activity with juvenile boys on multiple occasions.  The authorities executed the search warrant and seized Mr. Raby’s computer and other related evidence.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
3:08-cv-00979

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the Court are several motions by the parties for full or partial summary judgment: Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against the Loadout Nellis Surface Mine (Doc. 112); Intervenor-Defendant, Loadout, LLC’s, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 115); Intervenor-Defendant, Fola Coal Company, LLC’s, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 135); Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 139); and IntervenorDefendant, Fola Coal Company, LLC’s, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 150).  For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Parties’ motions.

Author:
Robert C. Chambers
2:09-cr-00102

Memorandum Opinion and Satement of Reasons

The United States charged Telford Cruikshank, Jr. with possessing or knowingly accessing with intent to view child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).  The offense carries a maximum term of ten years’ imprisonment.  Mr. Cruikshank pleaded guilty on May 18, 2009.  The Sentencing Guidelines recommend a sentence of 46 to 57 months in prison, with a term of supervised release between 5 years to life.  As explained below, such a sentence would be unreasonable in this case.  I thus sentence Mr. Cruikshank to 24 months in prison, followed by 15 years of supervised release, in addition to a special assessment of $100.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:09-cv-00382

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court are two motions to dismiss.  The first is defendant Advanta’s Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint [Docket 15] challenging the sufficiency of Claims III, V, and VII of the Complaint.  The second is a Motion to Dismiss by defendants Chase Home Finance and EMC Mortgage Corporation [Docket 17] seeking dismissal of Claims I, II, III, IV, V, and VII.  As explained below, the Motions are GRANTED.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:09-cv-00325

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court are the plaintiff Jennifer Workman’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 62], defendants Mingo County Board of Education and Dr. Steven L. Paine’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 98], and defendant Dwight Dials’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 102].  For the reasons explained below, the plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED, and the defendants’ Motions are GRANTED.  All other pending motions [Dockets 2, 73, 97, 118] are DENIED as moot.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:08-cv-00289

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending is the defendants’ joint motion for summary judgment, filed March 6, 2009.  Also pending is the defendants’ motion to exceed the page limit, which motion is ORDERED granted.

Author:
John T. Copenhaver, Jr.
6:08-cv-00953

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment [Docket 37 and 39].  I DENY the cross motions and REMAND the claim to the plan administrator for further development.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
3:09-cv-00842

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the Court is Defendant Diamond Mowers, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [doc. no. 10] and Plaintiff Carmichael Equipment, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint [doc. no. 7].  For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.

Author:
Robert C. Chambers
2:09-mc-00051

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court is a petition by Itmann Coal Company (“Itmann”) for Enforcement of an Administrative Order or, in the alternative, Contempt Proceedings [Docket 1]. By its Petition, Itmann seeks judicial enforcement of an order from a federal administrative agency, pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 927(b). Itmann contends that the United States Department of Labor, on August 25, 2005, ordered the respondent, Magdalene Scalf, to repay $50,913.60 for overpayments by Itmann. Ms. Scalf contends that a certification of facts is not properly before the court and the court therefore lacks jurisdiction. She also asserts that the matter is pending before an administrative law judge and that enforcing the order would be premature. For the reasons explained below, the court DENIES the Petition and DISMISSES this action for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin
2:09-cv-00507

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pending before the court is the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Docket 15]. The Motion presents two sets of issues. First, the Motion raises a choice-of-law issue. The defendants contend that Alabama law governs all of the plaintiff’s claims. The plaintiff disagrees and argues that West Virginia law applies to her marketing defect claim. Second, regardless of which state’s substantive law applies, the Motion challenges the sufficiency of the Complaint. As explained below, Alabama law governs the substantive issues in this case, except for the manufacturing defect claim. Furthermore, the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded her causes of action. The defendants’ Motion is therefore DENIED.

Author:
Joseph R. Goodwin

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