Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the court is the plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Dr. Elizabeth L. Anderson as an expert witness for the defendant [Docket 170]. For reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.
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Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the court is the plaintiffs’ Motion to Disqualify Dr. Elizabeth L. Anderson as an expert witness for the defendant [Docket 170]. For reasons set forth below, the plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending is the motion for partial summary judgment of Mid-State Surety Corporation (“Mid-State”), filed February 6, 2006. Also pending is the motion for partial summary judgment of International Fidelity Insurance Company (“Fidelity”), initially filed April 3, 2006, as a memorandum in opposition to Mid-State’s motion for partial summary judgment, and recharacterized as a motion for summary judgment by order entered September 5, 2007.1
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before this Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment (Docs. 56 and 59). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs’ cross-motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants’ cross-motion is also GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Also pending is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Exhibit to Their Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Doc. 68). This motion is GRANTED.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order (docket # 17), filed April 25, 2008, to which Defendant responded in opposition (# 18) on April 27, 2008. Plaintiffs did not file a timely reply.1 The Memorandum Opinion and Order entered by the Hon. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., presiding District Judge, on February 25, 2008 (# 12), sets forth the claims of the parties. To summarize, this is a first party breach of contract and bad faith action by attorneys against their legal malpractice insurer.
Amended Memorandum Opinion1
Plaintiff Barbara Kitchen brings this action against Defendant Summers Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC (formerly known as Summers Continuous Care Center, LLC) (Summers) alleging wrongful discharge and failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the West Virginia Human Rights Act (WVHRA).2 Pending before the Court is Summers’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 80]. For the reasons stated below, the motion is GRANTED.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
The court is called upon to decide, pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1)(G) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whether defendants Aquamine and Victaulic (“Defendants”) have shown good cause for certain documents, marked “CONFIDENTIAL” prior to disclosure to Plaintiffs during discovery, to remain confidential and subject to the court’s form protective order.
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Pending before the court are the respondents’ Motions to Dismiss Petition for Injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act [Dockets 26 & 30]. The respondents argue that the petition for an interim injunction should be dismissed on two independent grounds. First, the respondents urge dismissal because the petitioner lacks the legal authority to bring the petition on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board. Second, the respondents argue that injunctive relief is not “just and proper” under § 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j).
Memorandum Opinion and Order
I conducted a sentencing hearing on April 9, 2008. After calculating the relevant guideline range, hearing argument and evidence, and analyzing the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, I imposed a variance sentence of 30 months imprisonment, followed by a supervised release term of 4 years, which is below the guideline imprisonment range of 37 to 46 months. In this Memorandum Opinion, I explain why the conversion ratios contained in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 app. note 10(D) result in unwarranted sentencing disparities.
Memorandum Opinion
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 16] and the IRS’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 18].1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s appeal for re-determination of the validity of taxes assessed for the tax periods ending September 30, 1993 and December 31, 1993, respectively. Plaintiff originally challenged the validity of the assessments in a collection due process (CDP) hearing before the IRS Appeals Office, which upheld the assessments. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6320(c) and 6330(d), Plaintiff appealed the IRS’s determination to the Tax Court. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction,2 the Tax Court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal and instructed her to re-file her appeal in the appropriate United States District Court. On July 21, 2006, Plaintiff timely filed her appeal in this Court. The parties agreed to resolve the case on cross-motions for summary judgment, (See Docket 22 ¶ 3), and the Court heard oral argument on the cross-motions. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 16] and DENIES the IRS’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 18].
Memorandum Opinion and Statement of Reasons
In 2005, the Supreme Court determined that the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines regime violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and remedied this violation by excising the two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines mandatory, thus rendering them advisory. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 232-36, 258-63 (2005). In the wake of Booker, this court and many other district courts struggled to understand the bounds of their newfound sentencing discretion and attempted to strike a balance between the advice provided by the Guidelines and the policy instructions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The courts of appeals had the difficult task of reviewing such sentences for “reasonableness,” relying on the same waypoints for navigation. Id. at 264. I originally sentenced Mr. Moreland to a term of 120 months in prison and a supervised release term of 96 months. United States v. Moreland, 366 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (Moreland I). The Fourth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded, finding that term of imprisonment unreasonable and instructing this court to impose a sentence of not less than twenty years. United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 437-38 (2006) (Moreland II).